A senior Emirati diplomat has publicly acknowledged a strategic miscalculation in Sudan, marking a potential shift for a nation facing growing condemnation over its ties to the country’s most notorious paramilitary group.
Speaking at a regional forum, Anwar Gargash, a key foreign policy advisor, stated that the international community erred by not imposing sanctions following the 2021 military coup that derailed Sudan’s fragile democratic transition. “We all made a mistake,” Gargash conceded, referring to the joint takeover by the army and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). “We should have put our foot down collectively.”
This admission signals a notable departure for the United Arab Emirates, which had previously worked to bolster military influence in Khartoum following the 2019 uprising that ousted longtime autocrat Omar al-Bashir. Alongside regional partner Saudi Arabia, the UAE provided billions in financial support to Sudan’s post-revolution military council, a move analysts say critically weakened the concurrent civilian government and paved the way for the coup.
The focus of international scrutiny is now the RSF, the paramilitary force accused of carrying out widespread atrocities, including a recent brutal campaign in the city of El Fasher. For years, evidence from United Nations panels and independent investigators has pointed to the UAE as a covert source of weapons and funding for the RSF, allegations Abu Dhabi consistently denies.
The paramilitary’s leader, General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo “Hemedti,” cultivated a strong partnership with the Emirates after committing RSF troops to support the Saudi- and Emirati-led coalition in Yemen. This relationship extends into business, with Hemedti’s family firm controlling key gold mining operations in Darfur.
Sudan’s vast natural resources, particularly gold, are a central driver of foreign interest. The country possesses significant mineral and agricultural wealth, a powerful lure for Gulf nations seeking to secure food supplies and economic diversification. Official data shows the UAE is the primary destination for Sudan’s gold exports, though experts estimate up to 90% of the precious metal is smuggled out illicitly, much of it also flowing through Emirati channels.
Beyond economics, analysts point to a geopolitical motive: countering Islamist influence. The UAE has long viewed political Islamist groups, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood, as a fundamental threat to regional stability. This objective shaped its engagement with Sudan’s former regime and continues to inform its stance in the current conflict.
Facing increased pressure, including targeted sanctions from the United States on entities funding the RSF, Emirati officials now portray their country as a neutral mediator. They advocate for a return to the civilian-led government that was overthrown in 2021 and assert that both warring factions—the army and the RSF—have forfeited their right to govern.
The credibility of this repositioning is being tested. Human rights organizations argue that tangible steps, such as full cooperation with UN arms embargo monitors, are necessary to prove a genuine break from the paramilitary group.
Recent diplomatic efforts involving the US, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the UAE have produced a framework agreement calling for a humanitarian truce, a permanent ceasefire, and a transition to civilian rule within nine months. A critical clause in the pact also calls for preventing “violent extremist groups” linked to the Muslim Brotherhood from determining Sudan’s future—a condition aligning with core Emirati security interests.
Whether this diplomatic initiative can halt the fighting remains uncertain. The path forward hinges on whether external powers, particularly the UAE, decide that their long-term goals in Sudan are better served by ending the war rather than continuing to fuel it.